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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Antenuptial Agreement-Effect of Subsequent Misconduct-In con-
sideration of their remarriage, the parties entered into an antenuptial
contract wherein it was stated that the future husband had made a
will providing for a payment of $300 per month to his intended wife
as long as she should live. The contract further provided that the wife
should be pain $1000 per year for five years after his death. The
husband was granted a divorce thirteen years later, and died within
two years thereafter. Held: The judgment denying the wife's claim
against the estate affirmed. The parties contemplated that she should
remain his wife as long as they lived. Because the wife had failed
to fulfill her obligation, there was a want of consideration as to her, and
she could not require performance of the contract.Southern Ohio Sav-
ings Bank &Trust Co. v. Burkhart, 74 N.E. 2nd 67 (Ohio, 1947).
The problem is whether or not an antenuptial contract is affected
by subsequent misconduct of the parties so as to prevent the claimant
from enforcing the contract.
The settled rule in England is that where a marriage settlement has
been agreed upon between the parties, a woman does not forfit heer
right thereunder even though she violates the marriage vows. Thus
it has been held that where a wife lived in a state of adultery,' or
deserted her husband2, she would not lose her rights under such a
contract. The court in the Sidney case 3 regarded the agreement as
settling a vested pointure upon the wife, not subject to be divested by
her subsequent misconduct. One English Court4 went so far as to
say that nothing which occurs after marriage can give the court jur-
isdiction to alter the rights acquired under a settlement made in con-
sideration of the marriage. The dicta in the Moore case 5 to the effect
that subsequent adultery of the wife would entitle the husband to
enjoin enforcement of the marriage settlement has not been followed
and seems out of harmony with later English cases. Clearly, the Eng-
lish Courts regard the act of entering into the state of marriage as the
consideration for the antenuptial agreement.
The American decisions are in conflict with the weight of authority
favoring the view that subsequent marital misconduct does not forfeit
the rights of a spouse under an antenuptial contract, unless there is
fraud in the inception of the transaction.6 The conflict appears to be
in determining whether the consideration is the act of entering into
the state of marriage, or the continuance of the marital relationship
with performance of the rights and duties involved. Some courts en-
I Seagraves v. Seagraves, 13 Ves. Jr. 439, 33 Eng. Rep. 358 (1807).2 Moore v. Moore, 1 Atk. 272, 26 Eng. Rep. 174 (1737).
3Sidney v. Sidney, 3 P. Wins. 269, 24 Eng. Rep. 1060 (1743).
4 Evans v. Carrington, 1 Johns & H. 598, 70 Eng. Rep. 883 (1859).5 Ibid, 26 Eng. Rep. at 176.
6 For cases see: 29 A.L.R. 199.
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deavor to determine the intent of the parties.7 Other courts have dis-
tinguished contracts executed at the time of the marriage ceremony
from those dependent on the marital relationship." A Minnesott Court
in making this distinction held that where the obligation of the husband,
under an antenuptial contract, to make payments of money to his
wife has matured and the money has become due, the cause of action
so perfected is not defeated by the wife's subsequent desertion of the
husband.9 The court distinguished the case from York v. Ferner'2
wherein the contract was dependent on the marital relation. In the
latter case the court held that in a contract of -marriage the parties
always contemplate that they shall live together as husband and wife
as long as the marriage relation shall exist, busject, of course, to such
absence from one another or separation as may be agreed upon or
justified by law. The majority of states follow the rule that misconduct
of the spouse after the marriage, or failure to carry out the marital
obligations, does not entitle the other spouse to rescind an executed
marriage settlement.' Estrangement, separation, or divorce will not
of itself extinguish an executed marriage settlement.'2
As to evecutory contracts where there is subsequent misconduct,
separation, or divorce there is also a division of authority. The major-
ity of courts hold that mere separation without fault does not result
in a forfeiture' 3 or right of rescission, there being at most only a partial
failure of consideration, and equity generally will not rescind an ante-
nuptial contract forpartial failure of consideration.' 4 The opposite view
is that such separation or desertion not due to acts of the other party
which would be grounds for divorce does forfeit one's rights under
an antenuptial contract.'5 A Georgia Court cited Bishop onMarriage
and Divorce as stating that where the divorce is obtained for some
act, such as adultery, the marriage settlement would remain unaffec-
ted.', The court criticized the above statement cltiming that the au-
thorities cited from Bishop are wrong in principleY.1
7BibeIhausen v. Bibelhausen, 159 Wis. 365, 150 N. W. 516 (1915); Seuss v.
Schukat, 358 Ill. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934).
s Cryar v. Cryar, 243 Ala. 318, 10 So. (2d) 11 (1942) ; Johnston v. Johnston, 182
Iowa 481, 166 N.W. 65 (1918); 29 A.L.R. 202-203.9 Sparrow v. Sparrow, 172 Minn. 91, 214 N.W. 791 (1927).
20 York v. Ferner, 59 Iowa 487, 13 N.W. 630 (1882).
126 Am. Jur., Sec. 303, P. 903.12 Johnston v. Johnston, 182 Iowa 481, 166 N.W. 65 (1918); Ibid, 26 Am. Jur.,
Sec. 303, p. 903.
13 Schnepfe v. Schnepfe, 124 Md. 330, 92 At. 891 (1914).
14 Jackson v. Jackson, 222 Ill. 46, 78 N.E. 19 (1906).
'5 Veeder v. Veeder, 195 Iowa 587, 192 N.W. 409 (1923).16 Barclay v. Waring, 58 Ga. 86 at 93 (1877).
"1 The court in the Barclay case, ibid., stated at page 94: "In every case where
either party violated the contract of marriage so as to annul it, that party so
guilty of breach of contract as to cause it to be set aside, ought to forfeit all
rights under it, and should be put where he was before the marriage."
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New Jersey, representing the minority view, has held that where
the parties entered into an executory antenuptiol contract and were
married in New York, and the wife subsequently divorced the husband
in Missouri for a cause not recognized in New York, she was not
entitled to enforce the antenuptial agreement as she was bound to re-
main his wife unless justified in divorcing him under the laws of New
York.18 This case has been cited by many courts in following the min-
ority view. The supreme Court of Illinois has stated in a compara-
tively recent case that divorce cuts off the relationship of the parties
and terminates the antenuptial agreement which was dependent on
the marriage. 19
The trend of the more recent decisions appears to be toward the
latter view, which seems basd on better reasoning. This is especially
true where there has been a final decree of divorce based upon the
fault of the party claiming the benefits of the antenuptial agreement.
It would seem reasonable to assume the usual intent of the parties to
be that the consideration for the antenuptial agreement is the fulfill-
ment of the duties of the marital relation, and the living together as
husband and wife, and not entering into the state of marriage alone.
W. B. VAN VLEET JR.
18 New Jersey Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Parker, 85 N.J. Eq. 557, 96 Atl. 574
(1916), noted and criticized in 29 Harvard Law Review 881 (1916).
19 Seuss v. Schukat, 358 Ill. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934), in which case the parties
were divorced and later remarried, with no mention of the antenuptial agree-
ment to the first marriage. The court held that the parties remarried as strang-
ers, and the antenuptial agreement was of no force or effect.
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